Hell in the New Testament

On April 15, I had the opportunity to present my paper entitled “Hell No? The Void of New Testament Theology” at the Doctoral Biblical Studies Seminar at Asbury Theological Seminary. This is a work of New Testament theology on the negative afterlife. My fellow Ph.D. student Donald Murray Vasser responded with a scholarly review.

Here is the paper abstract:

“It is no small quest to understand and plunge the depths of such a heated matter as Hell. Many throughout church history have perennially ventured on such an endeavor, some understandably with hesitancy and reluctance. At best, their efforts have demonstrated that this doctrine is vitally important for understanding the Christian take on the afterlife. At worst, they have left us today gazing into an abyss of immortal uncertainty about the final destination of the wicked. While some still hold to a traditional interpretation of Hell, many today have meandered off the trail pushing the theological boundaries with universalism, annihilationism, and purgatory. Furthermore, these differing perspectives and the unending debates concerning them seem to lead to more frustration and confusion, putting everyone into a state of “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” Not only so, but these further leave people asking the question, “What exegetical support is there for such proposed claims anyways?” The task set before us then in answering these questions is to delve into the recesses of Hell as presented in the NT and mine the quarry therein in order to provide a thoroughly exegetical NT theology of Hell. As such, we will do this by describing and summarizing each explicit mention of Hell in the NT throughout its major sections: (1) in Jesus and the Gospels, (2) in the book of Acts, (3) in the Pauline Epistles, (4) in the Catholic Epistles, and (5) in Revelation. After the survey of each major section, I will discuss the theological implications of that section for contemporary theology and the church. To finish, I will synthesize the various perspectives on Hell in the NT, thus setting forth a NT theology of Hell. Overall, I am arguing that only the traditional interpretation of Hell holds true when compared with the theology of Hell found in the NT. Put another way, neither universalism, annihilationism, nor purgatory have any exegetical grounding in the NT, but only the traditional take on the fate of the nefarious.”IMG_2534

The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard (Part 4)

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This is Part 4 of a 4 Part series comparing the ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard. In Part 1 we looked at the evidence that Bonhoeffer knew Kierkegaard’s work on ethics. In Part 2, we looked at Bonhoeffer’s ethics. Last time in Part 3, we looked at Kierkegaard’s ethics. Finally, here in Part 4, we will compare their approaches to ethics and draw our conclusions.


Last time in Part 3, we examined Soren Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics. In sum, his ethics were (1) Existential and (2) had three progressive stages, namely the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, the last of which he defines as a “teleological suspension of the ethical” which means that the ethical thing to do is to obey the will of God even if the action is unethical (e.g. Abraham sacrificing Isaac). In short, ethics for Kierkegaard was about the will of God. Now in Part 4, we will compare and contrast Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’s approaches to ethics making our final conclusions.


With regard to their similarities, Bonhoeffer’s foundational question, “What is the will of God?” in Ethics is quite similar to Kierkegaard’s teleological suspension of the ethical in Fear and Trembling. The preoccupation with obedience to God’s will in both approaches is inestimably noteworthy. This is by far the most important point of contact between their two approaches. Second, they both critique the traditional approaches to ethics; Bonhoeffer in explicitly naming and calling out the bankruptcy of these approaches and Kierkegaard in suspending them for the sake of the end goal.

With regard to their differences, Bonhoeffer’s approach is very communal – particularly seen in his for-othersness – whereas Kierkegaard’s is almost wholly individual – seen in his focus on Abraham the knight [singular] of faith. Second, their historical contexts are totally different. Bonhoeffer is reacting to one of the most extreme ethical dilemmas known to human history – Hitler and Nazism – while Kierkegaard is somewhat safe and sound in Denmark during a time void of world-wide war and calamity. Thirdly, Kierkegaard’s ethics are notably existential, whereas Bonhoeffer’s are Christocentric, ontological, and situational.

Overall, while there may be more differences between Bonhoeffer’s and Kierkegaard’s approaches to ethics, the two similarities carry far more weight than the differences. Thus, for this reason, we deduce that there is a strong similarity between the way Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Sǿren Kierkegaard approach ethics, particularly in relation to their preoccupation with obeying the will of God.


In conclusion, we have explored three questions concerning the points of contact between Bonhoeffer’s and Kierkegaard’s approaches to ethics. First, we asked “To what degree did Bonhoeffer interact with and know Kierkegaard’s works and in particular, are there any places where he speaks about Kierkegaard’s ethics?” To that we have answered definitively that Bonhoeffer did know and interact with Kierkegaard’s works and there is one place in particular where he even critiques Kierkegaard’s ethics.

Our second question followed as such: “What were Bonhoeffer’s and Kierkegaard’s approached to ethics?” To that we have answered that Bonhoeffer approached ethics Christologically, ontologically, situationally, perhaps apocalyptically, vicariously, and non-traditionally, whereas Kierkegaard did so existentially, progressively, non-traditionally, and teleologically.

Lastly, we asked the question: “What similarities and differences exist between their approaches?” To that we have answered and demonstrated that there are two robust similarities between their approaches and several minor points of dissimilarity.

But the question still remains, “Did Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics influence Bonhoeffer’s approach?” In light of this study, I think that it is safe to conclude that Kierkegaard did in fact influence Bonhoeffer’s approach to ethics, though the degree of influence seems somewhat indeterminate and ambiguous. The stark similarity of their emphasis upon obedience to the will of God seems to be the strongest indicator of influence. Moreover, the similarity of disregarding traditional approaches to ethics could be due to Kierkegaard’s influence upon Bonhoeffer; however it seems more probable that Bonhoeffer’s own situation is what sparked an intrigue to devise a new approach. In addition, the fact that Bonhoeffer so clearly critiques Kierkegaard’s stages in his letter to the Bethge’s may suggest that he in fact did not hold to Kierkegaardian ethics. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer does not mention Kierkegaard’s teleological suspension of the ethical there and thus we do not have enough evidence to say that he did not hold to the ethical suspension. That would be an argument from silence. In light of this somewhat conflicting evidence, we can therefore conclude that to some degree Kierkegaard probably influenced Bonhoeffer’s approach to ethics, particularly regarding obedience to the will of God, though this influence was not without evaluation, critique, and contextualization to Bonhoeffer’s own needs in his own historical situation.


Backhouse, Stephen. Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism. New York: Oxford, 2011.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Ethics. Translated by Neville Horton Smith. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Letters and Papers from Prison. Edited by Eberhard Bethge. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953.

de Gruchy, John W. The Cambridge Companion to the Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dooley, Mark. The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility. New York: Fordham, 2001.

Gordis, Robert. “The Faith of Abraham: A Note on Kierkegaard’s ‘Teleological Suspension of the Ethical.’” Judaism 25:4 (1976): 414-419.

Green, Clifford J. Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.

Hoffman, Kevin. “Facing Threats to Earthly Felicity: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling.” Journal of Religious Ethics 34:3 (2006): 439-459.

Hough, Sheridan. “Kierkegaard’s Teleological Suspension is Not a Bride in Madison County.” Journal of Social Philosophy 31:2 (2000): 146-152.

Jolivet, Regis. Introduction to Kierkegaard. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co: 1946.

Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. Edited by  C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh. Translated by Sylvia Walsh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Muggeridge, Malcolm. A Third Testament: A Modern Pilgrim Explores the Spiritual Wanderings of Augustine, Blake, Pascal, Tolstoy, Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, and Dostoevsky. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2004.

Rose, Tim. Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology. Burlington: Ashgate, 2001.

Stack, George J. Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics. University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1977.

Wand, J. W. C. The Minds behind the New Theology: Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoeffer. London: Mowbray, 1963.

Ziegler, Philip. “Christ For Us Today – Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15:1 (2013): 25-41.

Ziegler, Philip. “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – An Ethics of God’s Apocalypse?” Modern Theology 23:4 (2007): 579-594.

Sola Exegesis: Why Sola Scriptura Is Not Enough

Temple of Olympian Zeus, Athens, Greece

Sola Exegesis: Why Sola Scriptura Is Not Enough

At the time of the Reformation, there were two major battle cries among Protestants: Sola Scriptura (“Scripture alone”) and Semper Reformanda (“Always reforming”). It is the former that I am concerned with here. Within Protestant circles today, clergy and laity alike claim to uphold the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, however in practice they have all but forgotten that the claim Sola Scriptura means Scripture alone rightly understood. It is my contention then that the only method by which we can rightly understand Scripture is through the method of Exegesis. For those that are unfamiliar with the term Exegesis, this is a method of biblical interpretation that draws out meaning from the text of Scripture instead of reads into the text what’s not there. Exegesis, then, seeks to understand the Bible within its original contexts – namely, the historical, literary, social, cultural, rhetorical, and linguistic contexts of the Bible in the ancient worlds of the Ancient Near East (OT) and the Greco-Roman world (NT) – in order to draw out its meaning. So in order to do Exegesis well, one must use a variety of critical approaches to interpretation such as the historical-critical method, literary criticism, rhetorical criticism, social-scientific criticism, source criticism, form criticism, redaction criticism, linguistics, etc.

I am, therefore, suggesting that Sola Scriptura is not enough, because the Bible needs interpreting and interpretation requires method. So I am proposing a new motto: Sola Exegesis – Exegesis alone! Only the method of Exegesis will help us rightly understand the Bible in it’s original contexts, and once rightly understood in it’s original contexts, then we can rightly appropriate it for us today in our 21st century context.

Another facet of Sola Exegesis is that the method of Exegesis should be the foundation for developing and understanding Biblical Theology, both Old and New Testament theology. So then, Exegesis is not for Exegesis’ sake, rather it leads us forward to theology; a movement from Exegesis to Theology. And this is not simply for Theology’s sake, rather biblical theology moves us to ministry and Christian living; from Exegesis to Theology to Ministry. This is the process, I believe, that guides the second cry of the Protestant Reformation, Semper Reformanda (“Always reforming”). So then, we do Exegesis…which forms our Theology…which shapes our Ministry…and then we do it over again. And again. And again. This is the ongoing process of Christian living and always reforming. But Sola Scriptura is not enough, because a method of biblical interpretation must be chosen; and I am choosing Exegesis. Will you join me in the journey, in this ongoing process of Christian living?

Together we can discover what the Old and New Testament emphasizes via Biblical Theology, and then we ourselves can emphasize what OT Jews and NT Christians emphasized in our lives and ministry as the body of Christ. Together, therefore, we can discover how Biblical Theology founded upon Biblical Exegesis should shape Christian preaching, teaching, evangelism, and ministry in our 21st century world. Will you join me?

Resources for Exegesis

Michael Gorman’s “Elements of Biblical Exegesis.” David Bauer’s “Inductive Bible Study.”

Resources for Biblical Theology

Ben Witherington’s “The Indelible Image” volumes 1 and 2

These resources can be found on www.amazon.com

The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard (Part 3)

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This is Part 3 of a 4 Part series comparing the ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard. In Part 1 we looked at the evidence that Bonhoeffer knew Kierkegaard’s work on ethics. Last time in Part 2, we looked at Bonhoeffer’s ethics. Here in Part 3, we will look at Kierkegaard’s ethics. Finally, in Part 4, we will compare their approaches to ethics and draw our conclusions.


Last time in Part 2, we examined Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s approach to ethics. In sum, Bonhoeffer’s ethics were (1) Christocentric, (2) Virtue-Based, (3) Situational/Contextual, (4) Apocalyptic, (5) “for-others”, and (6) distinctly different from the traditional approaches to ethics, asking the question, “What is the will of God?” instead of “What is good?” Now in Part 3, we will move to exploring Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics.


First and foremost, Kierkegaard approached ethics as an existentialist and thus his ethics are classified as existential ethics.[1]

Secondly, Kierkegaard speaks of progressive stages of human morality and growth: (1) the aesthetic, (2) the ethical, and (3) the religious.

The first aesthetic stage is characterized by a love for pleasure and the sensuous, and is therefore the lowest of the three.[2]

The second ethical stage for Kierkegaard is better than the aesthetic stage, though is still somewhat disparaging in comparison to the religious stage. Here the person does their duty to what they know to be right or wrong.[3] This Kierkegaard says is good but falls short of the ultimate.

The third and ultimate stage then for him is the religious.[4] This is the stage that we find at work when we turn to his classic book called Fear and Trembling. In this religious stage, Kierkegaard addresses the issue of Abraham’s faith and God commanding him to offer his son Isaac on the altar. For Kierkegaard, Abraham in this OT story is “either at every moment a murderer or we are at the paradox that is higher than all mediations” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 58). Thus, he fervently seeks to present a positive account for the morality of Abraham. In doing so, Kierkegaard concludes that there is a “teleological suspension of the ethical” (Fear and Trembling 49) [5]. This means that what would normally be classified by traditional approaches to ethics as murder – and thus unethical – is not the case with Abraham from Kierkegaard’s perspective. For starters, Abraham was commanded by God to do this. Thus, in this situation he says that Abraham is faced with a temptation to disobey God’s command. He says Abraham’s temptation here “is the ethical itself, which would keep him from doing God’s will” (Fear and Trembling 52). Further, he says, “what then is the duty? Well, the duty is precisely the expression for God’s will” (Fear and Trembling 52). Thus, Kierkegaard asserts that the ethical thing for Abraham to do is to obey God’s will in sacrificing his son even though traditional ethics condemn such an act. In this way, “the ethical” is suspended or momentarily set aside for the sake of the end goal, namely, to obey God.[6]

Thus, Kierkegaard denigrates the traditional approach to ethics, at least in regard to the issue of Abraham. To Kierkegaard, Abraham is the individual “knight of faith” who is a true hero of life and ethics, a model for humans to follow, one who obeys the will of God at all costs.

Next time in Part 4, we will compare and contrast Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’s approaches to ethics and draw our conclusions.

End Notes

[1] See George J. Stack, Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1977) for a monograph on the assessment of Kierkegaard’s existential ethics.

[2] See Regis Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co: 1946), 124-133 for a chapter on the aesthetic stage.

[3] See Jolivet, Introduction, 134-142 for a chapter on the ethical stage.

[4] See Jolivet, Introduction, 143-201 for two chapters on the religious stage.

[5] He clearly states this at the telos of the discussion: “The story of Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of the ethical” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 58).

[6] Some scholars critique Kierkegaard’s use of the biblical Abraham saying that his view is anachronistic. See Robert Gordis, “The Faith of Abraham: A Note on Kierkegaard’s ‘Teleological Suspension of the Ethical,’” Judaism 25:4 (1976): 414-419 for a short and unique article which does this very thing.

The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of a 4 Part series comparing the ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard. Last time in Part 1 we looked at the evidence that Bonhoeffer knew Kierkegaard’s work on ethics. Here in Part 2, we will look at Bonhoeffer’s ethics. Next in Part 3, we will look at Kierkegaard’s ethics. Finally, in Part 4, we will compare their approaches to ethics and draw our conclusions.


Last time in Part 1, we examined the occurrences in Letters & Papers from Prison where Dietrich Bonhoeffer mentions Kierkegaard and his works. From this, we concluded that Bonhoeffer not only knew of Kierkegaard’s work, but indeed knew his work on ethics. Here in Part 2, we will now move to explore the details concerning Bonhoeffer’s approach to ethics.


First and foremost, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s ethics were Christocentric as was his theology and sociality. His Christocentric ethics then are worked out in three theological caveats of being conformed to Christ (German: Gestalt Christi): (1) the Incarnate Christ, (2) the Crucified Christ, and (3) the Risen Christ [Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 82-83].

Second, Bonhoeffer’s ethics are essentially ontological or virtue-based ethics. In Ethics, he says,

What is worse than doing evil is being evil. It is worse for a liar to tell the truth than of a lover of truth to lie. It is worse when a misanthropist practices brotherly love than when a philanthropist gives way to hatred. Better than truth in the mouth of the liar is the lie. Better than the act of brotherly love on the part of the misanthrope is hatred. One sin, then, is not like another. They do not all have the same weight. There are heavier sins and lighter sins. A falling away is of infinitely greater weight than a falling down. The most shining virtues of him who has fallen away are as black as night in comparison with the darkest lapses of the steadfast.”[Ethics 67]

Thus, he believes that who a person is on the inside is more important than what one does on the outside.

Third, Bonhoeffer approached ethics from situation to situation – often called situational ethics. For him, an ethical decision had to be determined based upon each given circumstance and changing situation. Every situation is different and thus demands different decisions. His extreme situation with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany can surely account for why he would opt to take this approach. Some would summarize this in saying desperate times call for desperate measures. This situational approach is also characterized as being relational.[1]

Fourth, a currently controversial and “unsettled” topic regarding Bonhoeffer’s ethics is whether or not they are apocalyptic [2]. I think that there is some warrant to this, though others may dissent.

Fifth, a focus of Bonhoeffer’s ethics is that they are “for-others.” A large part of his others-focused ethics comes from his sociality and the I-Thou relationship which he develops in Sanctorum Communio (The Communion of the Saints). Furthermore, some think that Bonhoeffer largely had in mind the Jews specifically and the world in general when he speaks of being “for-others.”

Sixth, Bonhoeffer critiques and dispenses with the six major approaches of ethicists throughout history to ethics: (1) reason, (2) moral fanaticism, (3) conscience, (4) duty, (5) free responsibility, and (6) silent virtue (Ethics 67-69). All of them, he says, are inadequate to deal with “the present struggle” [3] which most assuredly is a reference to him working out ethics of coup d’état and tyrannicide.


In dispensing with the primary approaches to ethics throughout history, he therefore must present a new approach and this is precisely what he does. The question of ethics he says is not, “How can I be good?” or “How can I do good?” (Ethics 186). Rather, he says, “instead of these he must ask the utterly and totally different question: ‘What is the will of God?’” (Ethics 186). Thus, in this way, Bonhoeffer approaches ethics in a totally unique way that had never been done before. For him, ethics therefore is about obeying God and living out his will. Moreover, this was not something for the individual alone to do, but rather obeying God’s will as a definition for the ethical life is something for the community and the people of God.

Next time in Part 3, we will take a look at Soren Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics which is quite similar to Bonhoeffer.

End Notes

[1] Larry Rasmussen calls this “his relational, contextual ethic.” See John W. de Gruchy, The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 221.

[2] See Philip Ziegler, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – An Ethics of God’s Apocalypse?” MT 23:4 (2007): 579-594 for a detailed discussion.

[3] Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 306.

The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard (Part 1)

This is Part 1 of a 4 Part series comparing the ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Soren Kierkegaard. Here in Part 1 we will look at the evidence that Bonhoeffer knew Kierkegaard’s work on ethics. In Part 2, we will look at Bonhoeffer’s ethics. In Part 3, we will look at Kierkegaard’s ethics. Finally, in Part 4, we will compare their approaches to ethics and draw our conclusions.


Many points of contact exist between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Sǿren Kierkegaard.[1] One of these, I believe, happens to be their approach to ethics. In surveying the secondary literature, little ground seems to have been broken comparing their ethical approaches.[2] Thus, in this paper, I will venture to pioneer such a study by comparing Bonhoeffer’s and Kierkegaard’s approaches to ethics. In doing so, I will first ask the question, “To what degree did Bonhoeffer interact with and know Kierkegaard’s works and in particular, are there any places where he speaks about Kierkegaard’s ethics?” After answering this question, I will subsequently seek to answer the question, “What were their approaches to ethics?” Lastly, I will conclude by comparing and contrasting their approaches and determine whether there are points of agreement or disagreement in their approaches. Overall, I will argue (1) that Bonhoeffer knew of Kierkegaard’s ethics and (2) that Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics influenced Bonhoeffer’s approach to a limited extent.


With regard to my methods and approach to this study, I will default to using primary sources, particularly English translations of Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison and Ethics and an English translation of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. In light of this, with regard to my purview, I will limit my scope of interacting with secondary sources in this study for two reasons. First, very little literature has been written upon this topic. Secondly, I have limited space and time in this study and thus must raze this paper down to the bare minimum.[3]


To begin, I will first examine to what degree Bonhoeffer interacted with and knew Kierkegaard’s works and in particular his ethics. To do so, I will explore all the occurrences where Bonhoeffer cites Kierkegaard in his prison works and attempt to assess whether he hints at knowledge of Kierkegaard’s ethics.[4] These occurrences all happen to be in the later time of Bonhoeffer’s life when he was incarcerated by the Nazis.

1. A Letter to His Parents

On October 31, 1943, Dietrich sent a letter to his parents from the prison at Tegel. Within this letter, he thanks his aged parents for coming and visiting him and for providing him with a parcel of bread. Furthermore, he mentions that it is “Reformation Day” and proceeds to expound upon what Martin Luther wanted to happen and how the public’s reaction to his action resulted in the opposite of what he wanted, that is, “insurrection, the Peasant’s War, and soon afterwards the gradual dissolution of all real cohesion and order in society.”[Bonhoeffer, Letters & Papers from Prison (LPP), 123] Then, he talks about a debate he knew of among Lutheran scholars named Holl and Harnack concerning this issue. With pertinence for our study, he then mentions Sǿren Kierkegaard and his take on this subject. Bonhoeffer says,

As long as a hundred years ago Kierkegaard said that today Luther would say the opposite of what he said then. I think he was right with some reservations.” [Bonhoeffer, LPP, 123.]

Here, we see the first mention of Kierkegaard among Bonhoeffer’s prison writings. We can glean from this first of all that Bonhoeffer did know of Kierkegaard. However, this statement is so brief and lacks a context which speaks to ethics. Thus, from this letter to his parents, we cannot conclude that Bonhoeffer knew of Kierkegaard’s ethics.

2. A Letter to Renate and Eberhard Bethge

Next, on January 23, 1944, Bonhoeffer sends a letter to his beloved relatives, Renate and Eberhard Bethge. Within this letter he writes about many things at length. However, pertinent to this study is that he again refers to Kierkegaard. In discussing the recovery of the four mandates of art, education, friendship, and play in the church, he says of Kierkegaard,

I wonder whether it is possible (it almost seems so today) to regain the idea of the church as providing an understanding of the area of freedom (art, education, friendship, play), so that Kierkegaard’s ‘aesthetic existence’ would not be banished from the church’s sphere, but would be re-established within it?”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 193]

This seems to be somewhat of a critique of Kierkegaard and his base stage of human ethics, namely, the aesthetic. Bonhoeffer goes on further to critique even Kierkegaard’s second level of ethics, namely, the ethical stage. He says,

Who is there, for instance, in our times, who can devote himself with an easy mind to music, friendship, games, or happiness? Surely not the ‘ethical’ man, but only the Christian.”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 193]

This seems to be a further critique of Kierkegaard’s stages. Bonhoeffer seems to be saying that Kierkegaard’s final and highest stage – the religious stage – is the only place where freedom and the four mandates can find their place in church and society again, whereas Kierkegaard would have disparaged the mandates in ranking them at the aesthetic stage. In other words, Bonhoeffer is saying that only Christians (i.e. the religious) can experience the freedom of art, education, friendship, and play contra Kierkegaard who would disparage them altogether.

Thus, again we conclude that Bonhoeffer knew Kierkegaard’s work. However, in this letter, we see Bonhoeffer interacting with Kierkegaard’s ethics, not only that, but even critiquing them and purposing an alternative view. This indicates that Bonhoeffer did in fact know Kierkegaard’s ethics, but whether or not they influenced Bonhoeffer is another point entirely. Determining this from this particular letter is cannot be achieved since he combats his view rather than embraces it.

3. A Letter to Eberhard Bethge

Then, on March 9, 1944, Bonhoeffer writes a letter to Eberhard Bethge from Tegel prison. In the letter, he speaks of many things, yet fixates upon answering a remark from Bethge concerning “Michelangelo, Burckhardt, and hilaritas.”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 229] He focuses upon the meaning of the Latin word hilaritas and says that it means more than “serenity, in the classical sense,” but is also a “high-spirited self-confidence.”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 229] Within this discussion, he makes reference to Kierkegaard. Bonhoeffer says,

I admit that Michelangelo, Rembrandt and, at a considerable remove, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, are in quite a different category from those that I’ve mentioned. There is something less assertive, evident, and final in their works, less conviction, detachment, and humor. All the same, I think some of them are characterized by hilaritas in the sense that I’ve described, as a necessary attribute of greatness.”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 229]

Thus, again we observe that Bonhoeffer did in fact know and interact with Kierkegaard. However, from this passage in LPP, there is no trace as to whether he is interacting with Kierkegaard’s ethics, let alone whether they influence his own.

4. A Letter to Eberhard Bethge

Lastly, on July 28, 1944, Dietrich composes another though rather short letter to Eberhard Bethge from Tegel. Here, he again addresses a theological issue that Bethge brought up. The issue concerns health and fortune in the Old and New Testaments as relates to suffering and the cross. Within his brief response, Bonhoeffer mentions Kierkegaard and how he thinks that the Old Testament view of blessing is mutually exclusive to the cross. He says,

Now is it right to set the Old Testament blessing against the cross? That is what Kierkegaard did. That makes the cross, or at least suffering, an abstract principle; and this is just what gives rise to an unhealthy Methodism, which deprives suffering of its element of contingency as a divine ordinance. It’s true that in the Old Testament the person who receives the blessing has to endure a great deal of suffering…but this never leads to the idea that fortune and suffering, blessing and cross are mutually exclusive and contradictory – nor does it in the New Testament. Indeed, the only difference between the Old and New Testaments in this respect is that in the Old the blessing includes the cross, and in the New the cross includes the blessing.”[Bonhoeffer, LPP, 374]

Thus, again Bonhoeffer clearly knows Kierkegaard’s works. However, there is no trace in this letter that Bonhoeffer is interacting with Kierkegaard’s ethics. Moreover, like the second letter we examined, Bonhoeffer again critiques Kierkegaard’s position on the topic at hand and presents his own view.


Overall, in assessing these four letters from his time in Tegel prison, we can conclude that Bonhoeffer indeed knew of Kierkegaard and was versed enough in his writings to interact with his thought by memory without his books at hand. What is more, we can conclude that Bonhoeffer had some knowledge of Kierkegaard’s ethics, at least his three stages of the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious as we see in his letter to Renate and Eberhard Bethge. However, in this letter, we see Bonhoeffer critiquing Kierkegaard’s three stages and he sees some major problems with them, the effects of which were stretching all the way to the church and society of Bonhoeffer’s day. Thus, with this little though vital evidence, at this point, we can tentatively conclude that Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics did not influence Bonhoeffer’s. However, as we proceed and discuss the specifics of their approaches, this conclusion may or may not be warranted.

Next time in Part 2, we will look at the ethics of Bonhoeffer.

End Notes

[1] First, they were both Lutherans. Secondly, their theologies are Christocentric. See Tim Rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001) for a work on Kierkegaard’s Christocentric theology. Third, they both critiqued nationalism in their own times. See Stephen Backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism (New York: Oxford, 2011) for a study on his critique of nationalism. Also, they both speak on ethics of responsibility. See Mark Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility (New York: Fordham, 2001) for a book on Kierkegaard’s ethics of responsibility. Lastly, Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer were used and abused in a similar way as founders of the secular theology of the 1960’s. See Bishop J. W. C. Wand, The Minds behind the New Theology: Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoeffer (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1963) for a brief study on Kierkegaard’s and Bonhoeffer’s “influence” on this new theology.

All of this goes to show that a massive amount of work has yet to be done in comparing Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer. I believe that such a study would be profitable and would return abundant dividends, though such study has yet to be done.

[2] However, other similarities in their life and thought have been thoroughly explored. One is promeity within their Christology. See Philip Ziegler, “Christ For Us Today – Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard,” IJST 15:1 (2013): 25-41 for a great article comparing their thought on Christ being for us.

[3] At some point, I hope to expand this paper into several chapters interacting with “commentaries” on Kierkegaard’s and Bonhoeffer’s ethics and produce an advanced and in depth study on their approaches to ethics. This however unfortunate cannot be done here.

[4] Note that Bonhoeffer mentions Kierkegaard in Christ the Center and in some of his sermons, but these are in his early years before Bonhoeffer undertakes the task of writing upon ethics. Thus, I will limit my scope here to his references to Kierkegaard during and after he writes ethics.

Time Out, Time In: The Divine Transcendence of Time (Part 4)

Alarm clock on wooden table

This is the 4th and final Part of a series discussing God’s relationship to time. The question at hand is, “Is God inside of time, outside of time, or both?”

In Part 1, I introduced the topic and underscored its importance for Christian theology.

In Part 2, I looked at Wolterstorff’s Open Theism argument that suggests that God is inside of time, that is, God is everlasting. I concluded that this is least plausible among the three options.

In Part 3, I looked at Boethius’ traditional and widely held argument that suggests that God is outside of time, that is, God is timeless. I concluded that this too is quite implausible.

Now here in Part 4, I am putting forth my own new position – God is transcendent of time yet immanent in it – which sees this issue as both-and instead of either-or like the other two. 


The Transcendent Argument: Why It Is Most Plausible

Now that I have shown how the arguments of Wolterstorff (God is everlasting/inside time) and Boethius (God is timeless/outside time) are quite implausible and that there is need for a new position, I will now put forth my own new argument that the biblical God both transcends time as its Creator, and yet still acts immanently within it. As one can infer, this view is somewhat a middle ground between Wolterstorff and Boethius’ arguments. So, let me now lay out my reasons for holding such a view of God’s relationship to time.

First, the transcendent view upholds the attributes of God as espoused by classical theologians such as the omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence of God. Concerning God’s omnipotence (all powerful), if he is all-powerful, then he must therefore have power over time, not being subjected to it. In addition, this would imply that God cannot be bound within the constraints of time and be fundamentally temporal as Wolterstorff purports. Furthermore, presupposing God’s omnipotence, his Lordship over time also leads one to believe that he is not finite, but rather infinite. It is the finite world that he created that is bound to temporality. But since he is infinite, he does not need time to exist and cannot fundamentally be temporal (although his actions in the world can be temporal). Thus, God’s transcendence of and actions in time aligns with his omnipotence.

With regard to God’s omniscience (all knowing), if he knows all things, how does one account for his relation to time? On the one hand, if one holds that God is fundamentally inside time and experiencing temporality moment by moment, then he could not know what the future holds and therefore not know all things. On the other hand, if one holds that God is outside of time, then it is possible for God to know the past, present, and future, thus knowing all things (particularly with regard to what transpires in the temporal world). In addition, if God transcends all things (including time), then it is therefore possible for him to know all things. Thus, God transcending time and acting in time aligns with God’s omniscience.

Regarding God’s omnipresence (all present), if he is present everywhere then that would include temporality and non-temporality, both in and outside of time. Thus, to put God strictly in one time-frame or another would contradict his omnipresence. God is present outside of time because he transcends it. Nevertheless, he is present inside of time because he interacts with the temporal world. In other words, if God is not in time, then he is not omnipresent and if God is not outside of time, then he is not omnipresent. Only the transcendent argument can account for God’s omnipresence.

All these things lead one to seek an alternative to the traditional views of God as either timeless or everlasting because these arguments have unfortunately fallen prey to the “either-or” fallacy. However, when accounting for the attributes of God, it seems clear that the issue is one of both-and rather than either-or, at least according to classical theology which rests upon a biblical theology. God transcends time and exists outside of it, yet he is present and interacts in the temporal universe which he created. Because of this, the transcendent argument is the most plausible resolution to the inquiry about God’s relationship to time.


            However, one may object to this view in that I have not used any Scripture to argue this position. In response, I would have used much Scripture to give evidence of the transcendent argument. The main reason I chose not to is because I am Bible scholar and would write a thirty page exegesis paper on each Bible passage I would use to support the claims that God is omnipotence, omniscient, and omnipresent, and that is not my purpose in the series. So, I have made use of widely accepted biblical doctrines concerning the attributes of God instead of providing exhaustive explanations of biblical texts. Overall, I believe these doctrines give sufficient evidence in and of themselves.


            In conclusion, one upshot of the transcendent argument is that one does not lose certain attributes of God which have been established throughout two millennia of church history at the expense of others, whereas the everlasting and timeless arguments do. In this regard, it seems to maintain the biblical view of God as the Creator (of time) who is infinitely not subject to time, yet chooses to interact with his creation within time. In addition, it refocuses the issue of God’s eternity off of an either-or scenario onto the possibility of both-and, thus avoiding the pitfall of ascribing God as only outside of time or only inside of time. Lastly, it implies that the transcendent God of the Bible deserves worship from his creatures because he is both transcendent and immanent; both beyond and near them. This mystery and paradox is one that we could happily meditate upon for the next two millennia to come.


Peterson, Michael, ed. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. 4th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Peterson, Michael, ed. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. 4th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Wood, Laurence. God and History. Lexington: Emeth Press, 2005.

Time Out, Time In: The Divine Transcendence of Time (Part 3)

Alarm clock on wooden table

In Part 1, I introduced the topic at hand, namely, God’s relationship to time, and underscored its importance for theology and philosophy today.

In Part 2, last time, I critiqued Wolterstorff’s Open Theism argument which understands God as Everlasting showing its logical inconsistencies and why it is least plausible among our options.

Here in Part 3, I am going to discuss Boethius’ argument that God is Timeless, offer my critique, show how it is no better than Wolterstorff’s, and that a new position is needed.

Boethius’ Timeless Argument: Why It Is Not Plausible

            In the opening of The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius defines eternity by stating, “Now, eternity is the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one simultaneous whole.”[1] This is how he understands God’s eternity, namely, that “God lives completely outside of time, in a changeless ‘eternal now’ that contains all of time within itself.”[2] This view of God’s eternity seems correct in that it makes a clear distinction between God who is infinite and unbound by time and the universe which is finite and bound by time. While this argument of God as being timeless living outside of time may seem accurate at first glance, it is lacking in several areas.

First, as Wolterstorff conjectured, Boethius seems to rely too heavily upon Greek philosophy rather than biblical theology. He mentions Plato and Aristotle, but gives no credence to Holy Scripture, Jesus, or Paul. Thus, Wolterstorff’s critique seems to be valid.

Furthermore, this leads to the two main lacks in Boethius’ argument of timelessness: (1) that he does not explicitly state that God is the Creator of time and (2) that his timeless God is remote and does not interact with the time bound world.

First, explicitly stating that God is the Creator of time would have greatly strengthened his argument. While this is somewhat inferential of his view, it nevertheless would have bolstered his case had he overtly said that the reason why God is timeless and unbound by time is because he created it. This may be due to the fact that Boethius scarcely relies upon Scripture.

The second lack in his contention is that his timeless God is a distant spectator of the world that does not interact with his creation. He says, “God is the ever prescient spectator of all things.”[3] But is this all that God does with the world? Does he merely know all that will happen and then watch from the outskirts of time what transpires in time? Again, dependence upon Scripture would have aided Boethius in this respect.

From Genesis to Revelation, the God of the Bible intimately interacts with humanity and creation. God creates the universe and then calls the nation of Israel through Abraham to bless all the other nations of the earth with the knowledge of God. As they walk with God and fail over two millennia, God then sends his ultimate revelation, his own Son, to redeem his fallen creation. On the last day,[4] God will fully redeem humanity by destroying death forever when his Son returns to the earth to establish fully the kingdom of God on the new heavens and new earth. The biblical narrative is one which describes the God who interacts with humanity and creation which are finite and bound in time, and Boethius’ argument seems to ignore these perspicuous biblical facts. The Bible does not portray God as a spectator of the world, but the ultimate participant in it. Had he availed himself to Scripture, Boethius would have avoided such theological pitfalls in his argument. For these reasons, Boethius’ view is inferior to the God of the Bible.

Since both of the most popular views of God’s eternity are flawed (Wolterstorff and Boethius), I will attempt in Part 4 next time to set forth a biblical understanding of God’s relationship to time.

[1] Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 150.

[2] Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 150.

[3] Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 152.

[4] Notice, it is the end of temporality.

Time Out, Time In: The Divine Transcendence of Time (Part 2)

Alarm clock on wooden table

Wolterstorff’s Everlasting Argument: Why It Is Least Plausible

            In the 20th century, Nicholas Wolterstorff argued a different view from that of classical theologians concerning the eternity of God. He purported that God’s relationship to time and eternity should be understood as everlasting rather than timeless, that is, that God lives within rather than outside of time. Throughout his work God and the Good, Wolterstorff states his primary point and conclusion several times, namely, that God’s “own life and existence is temporal.”[1] While his work has several strengths to it such as (1) a critique of early Christian theologians relying too heavily upon Greek philosophy, (2) noting that God indeed does act in human history, (3) attempted fidelity to the Bible, (4) excellent biblical exegesis, (5) interaction with possible objections to his view, (6) unveiling the classic timeless view of God as “an impassive factor in reality” rather than an actively involved God in human affairs, and (7) recognizing that change in human history does not necessarily mean a change in God, Wolterstorff’s argument and logic has several problems.

First, his whole argument rests upon the assumption that if God is a redeeming God as the Bible portrays him to be, he therefore must be temporal because a redeeming God changes. He states, “If we shall accept this picture of God as acting for the renewal of human life, we must conceive of him as everlasting rather than eternal [timeless]. God the Redeemer cannot be a God eternal [timeless].”[2] His major premise here seems to be false. Just because God is a Redeeming God does not necessarily infer that he is everlasting no more than it would necessarily infer that he is timeless. Rather, it could imply several things. One alternative possibility which Wolterstorff ignores is that God foreknew the fall of humanity and planned beforehand their salvation and redemption. This seems to be the consensus among many biblical writers.[3] All in all, whether one accepts the doctrine of divine foreknowledge or not, the point is that Wolterstorff ignores this possibility assuming that the only conclusion to his premise is that God must therefore be everlasting. However, I maintain that God indeed has foreknowledge and because he had foreknowledge of the fall, he was therefore able to plan beforehand his plan of redemption for all creation. In this way, then, Wolterstorff’s premises and conclusion are logically inconsistent and unwarranted.

Second, he asserts that God’s acts have beginnings and ends and concludes that God is therefore fundamentally noneternal (i.e. God is temporal/everlasting). However, again this is fallacious logic. The proper inference of the premise “God’s acts have beginnings and ends” is that God’s actions are fundamentally temporal or everlasting, not that God himself is fundamentally temporal or everlasting. For all we know God could fundamentally be timeless. Regardless, the proper inference from Wolterstorff’s premise should be directed at God’s acts not God himself.

Thirdly, while Wolterstorff recognizes Heilsgeschichte (“salvation history”), also known as God’s acts in the history of salvation, he fails to see the possibility for the Redeeming God of Heilsgeschichte to exist outside of time. Again, he is basing his argument upon the presupposition that a Redeeming God must necessarily exist within time, not outside time. However, it is possible that the Redeeming God of Heilsgeschichte who transcends time could have planned out their redemption before time began, knowing beforehand that humanity would sin. It is not an absolute fact as he suggests that a Redeeming God must be bound to time planning out the redemption of humanity as time is transpiring and history unfolds. What he misses from Scripture is that the biblical God had a plan to redeem the human race before he even created the human race. Wolterstorff unfortunately ignores this important alternative.

Lastly, the most contradictory part of Wolterstorff’s argument comes at the end of his discussion. He states, “Though God is within time, yet he is Lord of time. The whole array of contingent temporal events is within his power. He is Lord of what occurs.”[4] However, it is contradictory to purport that God is fundamentally bound under the sway of temporality, and yet Lord over it. Is a king both a poor beggar and the wealthiest man in his kingdom? Of course not. Why then could one hold that God is subject to time yet in control of it? For if God is subject to time, then time has control over God, not vice versa. Only if God subjects time can he therefore be Lord of time.[5]

For these reasons, then, I think Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Open Theism view of God as everlasting is least plausible. In Part 3, we will consider why Boethius’ view is more plausible than Wolterstorff but still inadequate.

[1]Michael Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 153.

[2] Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 154.

[3] See Ps 139:4, 16b; Jer 1:5; Rom 8:28-30; Eph 1:4-5, 11; Rev 13:8. These all share the commonality of God’s foreknowledge, some about certain people and groups of people, while others concerning the salvation and redemption of humanity. This list is not exhaustive by any means, but Wolterstorff cannot ignore the biblical language of divine foreknowledge. How one understands God’s foreknowledge will certainly play a significant role in how one understands God’s relationship to time. As a side note, knowing all possibilities is not the same as knowing all things. If I apply for 4 Ph.D. programs (and I did) and am still waiting to hear back from them, just because I know all of the possibilities (1 of the 4 schools) does not mean that I will know where I will end up. So then I am in the dark about knowing the future. This example goes to show that just because someone knows all possibilities does not mean that they will know what will happen. So for God to have foreknowledge cannot simply mean that he knows all possibilities, foreknowledge means that God actually knows what will happen. And this of course does not mean that he causes it to happen (determinism). That discussion is for another time.

[4] Peterson, Philosophy of Religion, 159.

[5] I must briefly note here the contribution of Albert Einstein’s theory of general and special relativity which concludes that space and time are a unified entity (for an in depth analysis of this, see Laurence Wood’s God and History pp. 259-208). Thus, if God transcends space, as most theologians would assert, then God must also transcend time. If Wolterstorff wants to argue that God does not transcend time, then he must also argue that God does not transcend space. Once one moves into the realm of describing God as not transcending space, then one’s theological framework shifts from classical theism to pantheism. This is another logical inconsistency of Wolterstorff and others who espouse the Openness of God theology (Open Theism).

Time Out, Time In: The Divine Transcendence of Time (Part 1)

Alarm clock on wooden table

            For over two millennia, philosophers and theologians alike have debated the nature of God’s eternity and his relationship to time. While a consensus has not been reached, there are two main interpretive camps regarding the eternity of God. On the one hand, the vast majority of thinkers throughout church history have believed that God is timeless, that is, that God exists outside of and is unbound by time. On the other hand, a smaller few have thought of God as everlasting, existing within time. While both camps have exceptional reasons for their positions, both have logical and theological problems. Thus, in this paper, I will argue a new position, namely, that it is most plausible to perceive God as transcendent of time, existing outside of time while nevertheless acting and interacting with humans within time. Put simply, God transcends time yet acts within it. I will proceed henceforth by first underscoring the importance of the debate concerning one’s understanding of God’s eternity. Secondly, I will give my reasons why understanding God as transcendent is superior to viewing him is everlasting or timeless. Thirdly, I will discuss one possible objection to this thesis and attempt to give a solution. Lastly, I will conclude by stating the upshots of holding to the transcendent argument for God’s eternity.


            To begin, one cannot over underscore the immense importance of understanding God’s relationship to time. One reason why understanding God’s eternity is vital is due to the fact that many have discussed, studied, written, and debated this subject. This discussion is and has been vital to theology, philosophy, and the philosophy of religion for centuries from Boethius to Wolterstorff. Secondly, it is vital because God’s eternity intricately relates to the other attributes of God such as his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. For example, the claim that God is omnipotent means that God has power over all things. However, if God is bound and constrained to the realm of time, then he would not therefore also be omnipotent because time would have some sort of power over him. Thus, one can see from this example how understanding God’s eternity (whether he be timeless, everlasting, or transcendent) has vital implications pertaining to the other attributes of God.


            So in the next 3 Parts, I will defend my thesis of divine transcendence (1) by demonstrating the inadequacies of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s and Boethius’ arguments concerning God’s eternity and (2) by setting forth my own argument of God’s transcendence which is somewhat of a middle ground. In Parts 2 and 3, I will begin with asserting the strengths and contributions of their arguments followed by a critical examination of them showing why they are not plausible answers to the question of God’s eternity. Then, in the final Part 4, I will simply put forth my transcendent argument based upon classical theology, answer objections, and state the upshots of the argument.

Next time, in Part 2, I will look at Wolterstorff’s everlasting or Open Theism argument.