In Part 1, I introduced the topic at hand, namely, God’s relationship to time, and underscored its importance for theology and philosophy today.
In Part 2, last time, I critiqued Wolterstorff’s Open Theism argument which understands God as Everlasting showing its logical inconsistencies and why it is least plausible among our options.
Here in Part 3, I am going to discuss Boethius’ argument that God is Timeless, offer my critique, show how it is no better than Wolterstorff’s, and that a new position is needed.
Boethius’ Timeless Argument: Why It Is Not Plausible
In the opening of The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius defines eternity by stating, “Now, eternity is the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one simultaneous whole.” This is how he understands God’s eternity, namely, that “God lives completely outside of time, in a changeless ‘eternal now’ that contains all of time within itself.” This view of God’s eternity seems correct in that it makes a clear distinction between God who is infinite and unbound by time and the universe which is finite and bound by time. While this argument of God as being timeless living outside of time may seem accurate at first glance, it is lacking in several areas.
First, as Wolterstorff conjectured, Boethius seems to rely too heavily upon Greek philosophy rather than biblical theology. He mentions Plato and Aristotle, but gives no credence to Holy Scripture, Jesus, or Paul. Thus, Wolterstorff’s critique seems to be valid.
Furthermore, this leads to the two main lacks in Boethius’ argument of timelessness: (1) that he does not explicitly state that God is the Creator of time and (2) that his timeless God is remote and does not interact with the time bound world.
First, explicitly stating that God is the Creator of time would have greatly strengthened his argument. While this is somewhat inferential of his view, it nevertheless would have bolstered his case had he overtly said that the reason why God is timeless and unbound by time is because he created it. This may be due to the fact that Boethius scarcely relies upon Scripture.
The second lack in his contention is that his timeless God is a distant spectator of the world that does not interact with his creation. He says, “God is the ever prescient spectator of all things.” But is this all that God does with the world? Does he merely know all that will happen and then watch from the outskirts of time what transpires in time? Again, dependence upon Scripture would have aided Boethius in this respect.
From Genesis to Revelation, the God of the Bible intimately interacts with humanity and creation. God creates the universe and then calls the nation of Israel through Abraham to bless all the other nations of the earth with the knowledge of God. As they walk with God and fail over two millennia, God then sends his ultimate revelation, his own Son, to redeem his fallen creation. On the last day, God will fully redeem humanity by destroying death forever when his Son returns to the earth to establish fully the kingdom of God on the new heavens and new earth. The biblical narrative is one which describes the God who interacts with humanity and creation which are finite and bound in time, and Boethius’ argument seems to ignore these perspicuous biblical facts. The Bible does not portray God as a spectator of the world, but the ultimate participant in it. Had he availed himself to Scripture, Boethius would have avoided such theological pitfalls in his argument. For these reasons, Boethius’ view is inferior to the God of the Bible.
Since both of the most popular views of God’s eternity are flawed (Wolterstorff and Boethius), I will attempt in Part 4 next time to set forth a biblical understanding of God’s relationship to time.