

SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE

INSINUATIO AND PAUL'S AREOPAGUS SPEECH IN ACTS 17:22-31

PRESENTED AT THE PROGRAM UNIT
GRECO-ROMAN RELIGIONS:
INTERACTIONS WITH CULTIC SPACES IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD

TIMOTHY J. CHRISTIAN
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
4:50PM-5:15PM

INTRODUCTION

The book of Acts has seen no shortage of rhetorical analyses, especially regarding its speech summaries.¹ What is more, Paul's Areopagus speech in Acts 17:22-31 has received the most attention of any passage in the book of Acts.² With regard to its rhetoric, scholars unanimously agree that Paul employs *insinuatō* here, "saving the real bones of contention until near the end of the speech – to make sure he has established rapport with the audience before introducing difficult ideas," these being monotheism, repentance, judgment, and especially resurrection.³ A problem arises, however, whenever one inspects more closely the evidence that scholars provide for said claim, and this problem is twofold. First, most scholars cite secondary

¹ See especially Craig S. Keener, "Paul and Seditio: Pauline Apologetic in Acts," *BBR* 22 (2012): 201-224.

² Ben Witherington III argues, "This passage is in many regards one of the most important in all of Acts, as is shown by the enormous attention scholars have given it...In fact it has attracted more scholarly attention than any other passage in Acts." Ben Witherington III, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 511.

Many have written upon its interaction with Athenian philosophy and religion: see J. Daryl Charles, "Engaging the (Neo)Pagan Mind: Paul's Encounter with Athenian Culture as a Model for Cultural Apologetics (Acts 17:16-34)," *TRINJ* 16 (1995): 47-62; N. Clayton Croy, "Hellenistic Philosophies and the Preaching of the Resurrection (Acts 17:18, 32)," *NovT* 39 (1997): 21-39; Mark D. Given, "The Unknown Paul: Philosophers and Sophists in Acts 17," *SBLSP* 35 (1996): 343-51; Robert G. Hoerber, "Paul at Athens," *Concordia Journal* 21 (1995): 202-305; and Bruce W. Winter, "On Introducing Gods to Athens: An Alternative Reading of Acts 17:18-20," *TynBul* 47 (1996): 71-90.

Also, several have been written upon intertextuality: Joshua W. Jipp, "Paul's Areopagus Speech of Acts 17:16-34 as *Both Critique and Propaganda*," *JBL* 131 (2012): 567-588; and Kenneth D. Litwak, "Israel's Prophets Meet Athens' Philosophers: Scriptural Echoes in Acts 17,22-31," *Bib* 85 (2004): 200-216.

Also, some have been used for missions theology today: Lars Dahle, "Acts 17:16-34: An Apologetic Model Then and Now?" *TynBul* 53 (2002): 313-316; and Dean Flemming, "Contextualizing the Gospel in Athens: Paul's Areopagus Address as a Paradigm for Missionary Communication," *Missiology* 30 (2002): 199-214.

³ Ben Witherington III, *New Testament Rhetoric: An Introductory Guide to the Art of Persuasion in and of the New Testament* (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 69.

These scholars identify *insinuatō* in the Areopagus speech: Craig S. Keener, *Acts: An Exegetical Commentary: 15:1—23:35* (vol. 3 of 4; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 2668; David S. Morlan, *Conversion in Luke and Paul: An Exegetical and Theological Exploration* (LNTS; London: T&T Clark, 2013), 83; vanThanh Nguyen, SVD, "Paul's Sermon at the Areopagus: Preaching across Cultural Boundaries," *TBT* 52 (2014): 215-18; Karl Olav Sandnes, "Paul and Socrates: The Aim of Paul's Areopagus Speech," *JSNT* 50 (1993): 13-26; Witherington, *Acts*, 518; and Witherington, *NT Rhetoric*, 69.

Surprisingly, George A. Kennedy, Hans Conzelmann, and Richard I. Pervo – all rhetorically minded scholars – do not identify *insinuatō* in Acts 17:22-31. George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Hans Conzelmann, *Acts of the Apostles* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1987); and Richard I. Pervo, *Acts* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008).

sources on *insinuatio* as their main sources of evidence for *insinuatio* in Acts 17:22-31 at the expense of hardly citing any primary ancient sources on *insinuatio*. Moreover, if they do cite primary ancient sources, they will only cite maybe one or two verses from a rhetorical handbook or two, when in fact all five extant handbooks discuss *insinuatio* at length along with its various forms.⁴ This brings me to my second point: nearly all NT scholars treat *insinuatio* as if it were monolithic, when in fact it is quite multifarious.⁵ This paper, therefore, will seek to resolve this twofold problem by (1) offering a close reading of the primary ancient sources on *insinuatio*, namely, the five extant Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks; and (2) from this analysis demonstrating that many types of *insinuatio* were available to rhetoricians in the ancient world.

⁴ One scholarly article, outside biblical studies, that discusses *insinuatio* in all the rhetorical handbooks examines its use by Shakespeare. See Joel Benabu, "Shakespeare and the Rhetorical Tradition: Toward Defining the Concept of an 'Opening'," *Rhetoric Review* 32 (2013): 27-43.

⁵ Stanley E. Porter describes *exordium* and *insinuatio* as such: "Theory suggests that we will need to work harder, in the prologue especially, to secure the audience's goodwill in this mode; and we must introduce the creditable part of the theme before its discreditable aspects." See Stanley E. Porter, *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C. – A.D. 400* (New York: Brill, 1997), 100.

David E. Aune says the major function of the προοίμιον was "to put the audience in the proper frame of mind to listen to the rest of the speech...If the audience is hostile, this attitude must be changed through the προοίμιον before the argument can be presented." This hostile environment, then, calls for a different, roundabout approach: *insinuatio*. See David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2010), 380.

Witherington defines *insinuatio* as the opposite of "a sort of emphatic throwing down the gauntlet...where one merely hints at the real bone of contention at the outset and reserves until much later dealing with it." See Witherington, *NT Rhetoric*, 53.

Sandnes says, "The *insinuatio* will in an indirect way attract the attention of this audience, if necessary even by applying concealment. This approach is not restricted to the introduction, but may influence the entire speech...Naturally, one expects a deliberative speaker facing a critical audience to apply this even more consciously." See Sandnes, "Paul and Socrates," 15-16.

E. W. Bower sums up *insinuatio* as such: "The general idea, in fact, is to counter the audience's hostility by an indirect approach...preferably discrediting our opponent at the same time." See E.W. Bower, "ΕΦΘΑΟΣ and *INSINUATIO* in Greek and Latin Rhetoric," *CQ* 8:3 (1958): 224-230, at 224.

Kennedy is the only scholar I have found who gives a definition to mention the different occasions for *insinuatio*: "In many rhetorical situations the speaker will be found to face one overriding *rhetorical problem*. His audience is perhaps already prejudiced against him and not disposed to listen to anything he may say; or the audience may not perceive him as having the authority to advance the claims he wishes to make; or what he wishes to say is very complicated and thus hard to follow, or so totally different from what the audience expects that they will not immediately entertain the possibility of its truth. This problem is often especially visible at the beginning of a discourse and conditions the contexts of the proem or the beginning of the proof...Classical rhetoricians developed a technique of approaching a difficult rhetorical problem indirectly, known as *insinuatio*...The problem may color the treatment throughout the speech, and sometimes a speaker is best advised to lay a foundation for understanding on the part of the audience before bringing up the central problem." See Kennedy, *Rhetorical Criticism*, 36.

The goal, then, for this paper is to ascertain the exact type of *insinuatio* that Paul employs in Acts 17:22-31.

INSINUATIO IN THE GRECO-ROMAN RHETORICAL HANDBOOKS

All five of the extant Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks discuss *insinuatio* within their discussions of the *exordium*. What is more, these discussions all center around the question of possible prejudice against the orator, speech, or subject matter. As such, it is noteworthy at the outset to mention that the Greeks and Romans rhetorically approached prejudice in strikingly different ways as we shall see. In fact, the Greek handbooks do not use the technical term εφοδος, literally “round about” or “a way around,” which is the Greek equivalent to the Latin term *insinuatio*. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Greek handbooks do not mention the term and the Greeks even approach prejudice differently than the Romans, nevertheless their discussions concerning prejudice and the *exordium* still fit within the same category of the Roman *insinuatio*.

Greek Rhetorical Theory

Anaximenes, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (ca. 340 B.C.)

First, Anaximenes of Lampsacus discusses how an orator should approach prejudice in *Rhet. Alex.* 29. In 29.6b, he gives the three possible dispositions that an audience can have towards an orator: they can be “kindly disposed, or hostile, or neither good nor bad.” The first and third do not require much of the orator, and his advice is to use a standard direct *exordium*. However, the second type of a “hostile” audience is the most difficult situation for an orator to be in and it requires him to take a different approach. Anaximenes discusses this in *Rhet. Alex.* 29.10b-27a. First, there can be three sources of prejudice: against the orator, the subject matter,

or the speech itself (29.10b).⁶ Prejudice against the orator can come from either past or present circumstances, and he provides instruction for refuting such prejudice (29.11-23a). Prejudice against the subject matter can be overcome by employing anticipation and making excuses about the subject matter (29.23b-25a). Prejudice against the speech can be due to its length (e.g., too long), archaic style, or incredibility (29.25b-27a). Overall, Anaximenes suggests two different approaches: (1) a direct approach for an indifferent or unprejudiced audience, or (2) an indirect approach for a prejudiced, hostile audience. Concerning the direct approach, he says, “If we encounter no prejudice, either toward ourselves, the speech, or the subject, we shall lay out the proposal straightaway at the beginning, and call for attention and a favorable hearing for the speech later” (29.27b). Concerning the indirect approach, he says, “If there is some prejudice arising from what has been said about us, after anticipating the audience and introducing concise defenses and excuses against the prejudices, we shall make the proposal and call for attention” (29.28). In short, if the orator does not experience prejudice, then he uses a direct approach and immediately presents his case; but if the orator encounters prejudice, then he must deal with the prejudice upfront before he can make his case. Therefore, the typical Greek approach to prejudice (as we shall see in Aristotle as well) is to deal with it head on; not so the Romans (as we shall see later).

Aristotle, *Rhetorica* (ca. 330 B.C.)

Second, Aristotle discusses *exordium* in *Rhet.* 3.14 and how an orator should remove prejudice in *Rhet.* 3.15. Concerning the *exordium*, Aristotle instructs in *Rhet.* 3.14 that for a defense lawyer, the *exordium* must be used to destroy the prejudice that an accuser would have

⁶ Anaximenes also discusses avoiding prejudice in *Rhet. Alex.* 35.18 and dealing with prejudice in *Rhet. Alex.* 36.7-16.

aroused in his previous epilogue (3.14.7). One such tactic he suggests is to try to make the audience laugh (3.14.7). Moreover, there is no need for an *exordium* unless the audience has poor judgment or is prejudiced (3.14.8). Aristotle summarizes that, “all [orators] in their *exordia* endeavour either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own apprehensions” (3.14.10).

Next, in *Rhet.* 3.15.1-9, Aristotle lists nine methods for removing prejudice. First, as a general rule, an orator can clear the air about any possible disagreeable suspicions (3.15.1). Second, one can contest disputed points which can be done through four means: (1) “either by denying the fact or its harmfulness,” (2) “by asserting that its importance is exaggerated,” (3) “or that it is not unjust at all, or only slightly so,” and (4) “or neither disgraceful nor important” (3.15.2). Third, one can say “that it was a case of error, misfortune, or necessity” (3.15.3). Fourth, an orator can overcome prejudice by slandering the *ethos* of the accuser, if for instance the accuser or his kin has been charged for similar accusations in the past or present that they now are accusing the defendant of (3.15.4). Fifth, one can appeal to the fact, if applicable, that there were others involved in the charge, yet they have not been brought before trial (3.15.5). Sixth, one can appeal to the fact, again if applicable, that others have been proved innocent for the same behavior the orator is being accused of (3.15.6). Seventh, one can counterattack the accuser and discredit (*απιστος*) him, thus discrediting his accusations (3.15.7). Eighth, an orator can “appeal to a verdict already given” (3.15.8). Ninth, one can attack slander itself to demonstrate its great evil, “because it alters the nature of judgments, and that it does not rely on the real facts of the case” (3.15.9).

Summary of Greek Rhetorical Theory on *Insinuatio*

In sum, Greek rhetorical theory instructed orators to approach prejudice head on at the beginning of the speech so that they could successfully make their case. Removing prejudice at

the outset, for the Greeks, was crucial due to the fact that *ethos* was so important to them. As such, to gain the audience's goodwill, a previously maligned orator had to remove prejudice first before he could say all that he needed and wanted to say to make his actual case. So then, the placement of addressing prejudice was positioned at the beginning of the speech for Greeks. This is what we might call a Greek *insinuatio*.

Roman Rhetorical Theory

Cicero, *De Inventione* (ca. 91-85 B.C.)

Now concerning Roman rhetorical theory, the young Cicero wrote on *insinuatio* in *Inv.* 1.17 within his larger discussion of *exordium* in *Inv.* 1.15-18. In *Inv.* 1.15.20, Cicero discusses the five kinds of cases an orator can have: (1) honorable (*honestum*), (2) difficult (*admirabile*), (3) mean (*humile*), (4) ambiguous (*anceps*), or (5) obscure (*obscurum*). Moreover, he distinguishes two types of *exordia*, (1) a *principium* [direct approach] or (2) an *insinuatio* [subtle approach]. The *principium* is “an address which directly and in plain language makes the auditor well-disposed, receptive, and attentive” (1.15.20). The *insinuatio* is “an address which by dissimulation and indirection unobtrusively steals into the mind of the auditor” (1.15.20). A *principium* is used for honorable, mean, ambiguous, and obscure cases, whereas an *insinuatio* is only used in a difficult case, especially if the audience is violently hostile (*vehementer*). If they are only partially hostile, a *principium* should be used.

In *Inv.* 1.17, Cicero discusses *insinuatio* proper. He expounds at length the three causes of hostility, namely, a scandalous case, an audience won over by the previous orator, and an audience wearied by the previous orator. First, with regard to a scandalous case (1.17.24), Cicero says that the orator must shift the audience's attention away from what it hates to what it favors, while also concealing his intentions to defend the scandalous point. Once this is done, he can

approach the scandalous point little by little to defend it, while reassuring the hearers that what displeases them, displeases him. After this, he can demonstrate his innocence from these scandalous charges. The orator must also be careful not to attack the opponent openly, but rather assure the audience that he will not even mention the opponent. Doing so will imperceptibly win the goodwill away from the opponent. He could also share an analogous case worthy of imitation (1.17.24).

Second, with regard to a convinced audience (1.17.25), the speaker should promise to discuss first the opponent's strongest argument, particularly the one which the audience most favored. In addition, he could begin with a recent quote of the opponent, something still fresh in their minds. Another possible tactic is to appear perplexed and astonished, not knowing where to begin with one's response (i.e., indecision). Without this, they might "think that they have assented too readily" (1.17.25).

Third, with regard to a wearied audience (1.17.25), he can pledge to speak more briefly than prepared and surely not as long as his opponent. Another method could be a new topic or jest which results in "uproarious applause and shouts of approval" or a prepared fable, story, or "some laughable incident" (1.17.25). If the case is too serious for a joke, he could, "insert something appalling, unheard of, or terrible at the very beginning." Cicero concludes, "a mind wearied by listening is strengthened by astonishment or refreshed by laughter" (1.17.25).

Cornificus, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 86-82 B.C.)

The anonymous *Rhet. Her.* was possibly written by Cornificus, though previously and falsely ascribed to Cicero. The author claims to be the first composer of an "Art" (rhetorical handbook) to contribute a section on *insinuatō*, thus providing a full treatment of the *exordium*.

However, Cicero's unfinished *Inv.* mentioned *insinuatio* first.⁷ Cornificus treats *insinuatio* in *Rhet. Her.* 1.6 within the broader discussion of the *exordium* throughout *Rhet. Her.* 1.4-7.

Cornificus identifies two kinds of *exordia*, that is, the *principium* (direct opening) and the *insinuatio* (subtle approach) (1.4.6). Moreover, there are four types of cases in which an orator can find himself: (1) doubtful (*dubium*), (2) petty (*humile*), (3) discreditable (*turpe*), or (4) honorable (*honestum*). The doubtful, petty, and honorable cases use the *principium* (direct opening), whereas a discreditable case uses the *insinuatio* (subtle approach).

In *Rhet. Her.* 1.6, the author discusses *insinuatio* proper (the subtle approach) which has three occasions for usage: (1) when one's case is discreditable (*turpem causam*); (2) when the previous, opposing orator has won over the audience; and (3) when the previous, opposing orator has wearied the audience.

Regarding the discreditable case (1.6.9), an orator employing *insinuatio* should urge the audience to consider the agent, not the disreputable action. Also, he should express his own displeasure for said action, declare it to be unworthy and even heinous. He can also later on prove that he is innocent of this action where more space and time would permit. Moreover, he could use an analogy of a positive judgment made from a similar case, and then gradually connect this analogy to his own case. He could also deny any intentions to respond to the opponent, but then do so subtly.

Regarding a won-over audience (1.6.10), the orator should use *insinuatio* by promising to discuss his opponent's strongest argument first. In so doing, he should begin with one of the

⁷ *Rhet. Her.* 1.9.16 says, "In what I have thus far said I believe that I agree with the other writers on the art of rhetoric except for the innovations I have devised on Introductions by the Subtle Approach. I alone, in contrast with the rest, have distinguished three occasions for the Subtle Approach, so as to provide us with a thoroughly sure method and a lucid theory of Introductions."

opponent's statements – perhaps the last statement – and then he should use indecision, a stylistic figure of diction where one appears to be astonished with where to begin: “What had I best say?” or “To what point shall I first reply?” (1.6.10).⁸

Regarding a fatigued audience (1.6.10), the orator employing *insinuatio* should provoke laughter, and this can be done through several possible means:

...a fable, a plausible fiction, a caricature, an ironical inversion of the meaning of a word, an ambiguity, innuendo, banter, a naïvety, an exaggeration, a recapitulation, a pun, an unexpected turn, a comparison, a novel tale, a historical anecdote, a verse, or a challenge or a smile of approbation directed at some one (1.6.10).⁹

He could also promise to speak something other than what he prepared, and briefly recapitulate the previous speakers and what he now plans to speak on.

In *Rhet. Her.* 1.7, Cornificus contrasts *principium* and *insinuatio*. *Principium* (the direct approach) gains the audience's goodwill, attention, and reception immediately upfront through a direct appeal, whereas *insinuatio* (the subtle approach) does so covertly, “through dissimulation” (1.7.11). Later in *Rhet. Her.* 3.4.7, the author clarifies that *insinuatio* can be used in deliberative and forensic rhetoric, but not epideictic.¹⁰

Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* (ca. A.D. 91-100)

Quintilian discusses *insinuatio* within his section on the *exordium* in *Inst.* 4.1. He distinguishes between *principium* and *insinuatio*. In *Inst.* 4.1.25, Quintilian states that sometimes

⁸ In *Rhet. Her.* 4.29.40, the author later, under the third faculty of an orator (style), says this about Indecision: “Indecision occurs when the speaker seems to ask which of two or more words he had better use, as follows: ‘At that time the republic suffered exceedingly from – ought I to say – the folly of the consuls, or their wickedness, or both.’ Again: ‘You have dared to say that, you of all men the – by what name worthy of your character shall I call you?’”

⁹ He also advises that later in *Rhet. Her.* 3.9.17 that an *exordium* can be omitted if the audience was “wearied by the wordiness of our adversaries.” Thus, one would start the speech with the *narratio* or “some strong argument,” instead of the *exordium*.

¹⁰ See *Rhet. Her.* 3.6.10-3.6.11. Perhaps this is an argument from silence, but Caplan asserts, “Note that unlike judicial (see 1. iv. 6) and deliberative (3. iv. 7) oratory, epideictic lacks the Subtle Approach (*insinuatio*)” (175). Since this is a complete work, if *insinuatio* was appropriate for epideictic, the author surely would have mentioned it as he did for forensic and deliberative.

whenever an orator's case is "somewhat tougher" that he should wait to bring up the "naked harshness" of the case until after the goodwill of the judges is won. In such instances, *insinuatio* should be used and the major points of the case should be delayed until later on in the speech.

In *Inst.* 4.1.42-50, Quintilian discusses *insinuatio* proper. A *principium* is "impossible in scandalous cases" (4.1.42). In such scandalous cases, the orator must "insinuate himself little by little into the minds of his judges" (4.1.42). As such, *insinuatio* is fitting and recommended for three situations: (1) when the features of the case are discreditable; (2) when "the subject is disgraceful...with popular disapproval", or (3) when the outward circumstances "handicap" the case, excite odium, or excite pity (4.1.42).

In *Inst.* 4.1.44-45a, Quintilian suggests four possible ways to bolster the case in order to remove the scandalous elements. First, he recommends, "If the case itself is weak, we may derive help from the character of our client" (4.1.44) Second, "if his character is doubtful, we may find salvation in the nature of the case" (4.1.44). Third, if neither of these are an option, the orator must attack the opponent (4.1.44). Fourth, if the orator is unable to deny the scandalous facts of the case, he has five options: (1) exaggerate the significance of the facts, (2) declare that the purpose of the scandalous act is different than the purpose ascribed by the accuser, (3) demonstrate that the facts of the case are irrelevant, (4) show that the scandalous act can be atoned for through repentance, or (5) verify that the accused "has already been sufficiently punished" (4.1.45a).

In *Inst.* 4.1.48-50, Quintilian discusses two possible occasions for employing *insinuatio*. The first is whenever the opponents have won over the minds of the judges or audience (4.1.48a). In order to gain back their goodwill, an orator must (1) promise to produce his own proofs and evidence, and (2) elude the arguments of the opponent (4.1.48a). The second occasion

is whenever the audience is tired. In order to refresh them, the orator must (1) excite their hope saying that his response will be brief [4.1.48b], (2) capture their attention [4.1.48b], (3) use wit and entertaining matters [4.1.49a], or (4) anticipate possible objections [4.1.49b-50]. The major goal with the tired audience, thus, is to “alleviate their boredom” (4.1.49a).

Summary of Roman Rhetorical Theory on *Insinuatio*

In sum, Roman rhetorical theory instructed orators to approach prejudice and scandalous cases in an indirect manner, saving the difficult topics for much later in the speech. This meant that the beginning and middle parts of the speech must avoid the scandalous points and could even function as a buttering up of the audience. It was not until the end of the speech that such difficult or incredulous topics could be addressed. If they were addressed in the beginning or middle parts, they could only be implicit or done so covertly, little by little. As such, to gain the audience’s goodwill, a previously maligned orator had to avoid the prejudice upfront and make other points before he could bring up the scandalous parts. So then, the placement of addressing prejudice was positioned at the end of the speech for Romans. This is the standard Roman *insinuatio* for the scandalous case.

Lastly, Roman rhetorical theory added two other categories for *insinuatio*, namely, (1) for an audience that has been won over by a previous orator, and (2) for a wearied, tired audience. As such, there are three total kinds of Roman *insinuatio*; one for a scandalous case, one for a persuaded audience, and one for a tired audience.

Conclusions

In sum, the Greek *insinuatio* addressed prejudice at the inception of the speech, whereas the Roman *insinuatio* addressed prejudice at the culmination of the speech. Also, *insinuatio* could be a means to win over a persuaded or tired audience. So then, *insinuatio* was

not monolithic, but had at least three Roman gradations, plus the Greek rendition. As such, there were four different kinds of *insinuatio* in Greco-Roman rhetorical theory. At this point, it is now pertinent to decipher which type of *insinuatio* Luke portrays Paul employing in his infamous Areopagus speech.

INSINUATIO IN ACTS 17:22-31

With regard to *insinuatio* in Acts 17:22-31, Luke's portrayal of Paul using it falls into certain categories from the Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks.

First, regarding *Rhet. Alex.*, Paul faced a hostile audience (*Rhet. Alex.* 29.10b-27a). The type of prejudice is not against Paul himself (29.11-23a), nor against the speech (29.25b-27a), but rather against the subject (29.23b-25a). In particular, Paul's audience made up of Epicureans and Stoics was prejudiced against the Jewish-Christian notions of monotheism, repentance, final judgment, and especially resurrection. However, Paul does not follow Anaximenes' Greek arrangement for addressing prejudice. In other words, he does not approach these hostile topics straightaway upfront, but rather he waits to mention repentance, judgment, and resurrection until the end of the speech in 17:30-31 (*Rhet. Alex.* 29.28).

Second, regarding *Rhet.*, Paul seems to follow Aristotle's "general rule" to "clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion" (3.15.1). The suspicion about Paul is that he is preaching "foreign gods" (ξένων δαιμονίων), arguably Jesus and Anastasia (17:18). He clears himself of this by proclaiming their unknown god (17:23), clarifying that he is a monotheist (17:24-29) and that this one God has appointed a man (Jesus) as judge, the proof of this being his resurrection (17:30-31). So then, Paul clarifies that he is not proclaiming foreign deities (a prejudiced accusation), but rather one of their unknown gods.

Third, regarding *Inv.*, Paul has a difficult case [*admirabile*] (1.15.20-21) with a strongly opposed audience. As such, he uses *insinuatio* and not a *principium* (1.15.21). Concerning the

three types of hostility, Paul is not dealing with a persuaded or wearied audience via a previous orator (1.17.25), but rather a scandalous [*turpitude*] case, that is, monotheism, repentance, judgment, and especially resurrection (1.17.24). Paul begins by shifting the Athenians' attention away from the resurrection to their religious fervor thus building rapport. Also, he does not state outright that he will defend his case of the resurrection, but instead keeps them attentive upon this unknown god. He highlights the similar beliefs they share in common by quoting two Greek poets in 17:28, and in this way imperceptibly wins their goodwill (1.17.24). So then, he approaches the scandalous part of his case cautiously and waits until the end in 17:30-31 to mention it (1.17.24).

Fourth, regarding *Rhet. Her.*, Paul's case is not doubtful, petty, or honorable, but rather discreditable [*turpe*] (1.4.6). Thus, he uses *insinuatio* [the subtle approach] (1.4.6). Concerning the three occasions for *insinuatio*, Paul does not have an audience won over or wearied by a previous orator (1.6.10), but rather a discreditable case [*turpe*], "that is, when the subject itself alienates the hearer from us" (1.6.9). Again, this subject undoubtedly is Paul's call for repentance, proclamation of final judgment, and Jesus' resurrection (17:30-31). However, Paul does not seem to follow any particular instructions that Cornificus suggests for this type of *insinuatio*. This could be due to the forensic tone of *Rhet. Her.* whereas Paul's speech is deliberative. Nevertheless, Paul employs the *insinuatio* for a discreditable case, not the type for a persuaded or wearied audience.

Fifth, regarding *Inst.*, Paul is not in a situation with discreditable features or outward circumstances, but rather with a discreditable subject matter, especially resurrection (4.1.42). As such, Paul insinuates himself "little by little into the minds of his judges," because his subject is "disgraceful" and has "popular disapproval" (4.1.42). As such, Paul delays in bringing up these

contentious topics until much later in the speech after he has already built strong rapport in the beginning and middle parts.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Paul primarily sticks to the Roman arrangement for addressing prejudiced subjects, that is, he delays in bringing up repentance, judgment, and resurrection until the end of the speech in 17:30-31. As such, he gains their goodwill, attention, and reception throughout the speech, and insinuates his difficult case by waiting until the end to bring it up. Paul, therefore, does not use the upfront Greek form of *insinuatio*, nor does he use the other two Roman forms of *insinuatio* such as for a persuaded or wearied audience. Instead, he employs the most common type of *insinuatio* when one has a scandalous, discreditable case or subject matter. It is in this way, therefore, that Paul employs *insinuatio* in Acts 17:22-31.